Real-time macro monitoring and fiscal policy by Ley, Eduardo & Misch, Florian
Dis cus si on Paper No. 14-122
Real-Time Macro Monitoring  
and Fiscal Policy
Eduardo Ley and Florian Misch
Dis cus si on Paper No. 14-122
Real-Time Macro Monitoring  
and Fiscal Policy
Eduardo Ley and Florian Misch
Download this ZEW Discussion Paper from our ftp server:
http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp14122.pdf
Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von  
neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung  
der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.
Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW  research prompt ly avai la ble to other  
eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly  
respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW.
Real-Time Macro Monitoring and Fiscal Policy
Eduardo Ley
The World Bank, Washington DC, USA
Florian Misch
Centre for European Economic Research, Mannheim, Germany
Version: December 19, 2014 — 1:35 P.M.
Abstract: This paper considers the effects of inaccurate real-time output
data on fiscal policy, both with respect to budgetary planning and fiscal
surveillance. As newer and better information becomes available, output
data available in real time get revised and are likely to conflict with final
figures that are only released some years later. By contrast, fiscal policy
is inevitably based on real-time figures. The paper develops a simple but
comprehensive modeling framework to formalize the linkages between out-
put data revisions and fiscal policy and combines it with a newly compiled
dataset from the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook,
comprising final and real-time output data for 175 countries, over a pe-
riod of 17 years. Based on a simulation exercise, it finds that output
data revisions alone may significantly undermine the reliability of real-time
estimates of the overall and structural fiscal balances, and that output
data revisions may result in unplanned and substantial debt accumulation.
The paper also shows that there are significant differences across country
income groups.
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“It does make economic sense to target cyclically adjusted rather than actual deficits. But
the improvement in economics is at the cost of a reduction in precision. Nobody knows what a
structural deficit is.” —Martin Wolf, Financial Times, March 6, 2012.
“The most important product of knowledge is ignorance.” —David Gross, 2004 Physics Nobel
laureate.
1. Introduction
This paper assesses the implications of output data revisions for fiscal policy. For bud-
getary planning and fiscal surveillance, it is imperative to correctly project and estimate
the overall fiscal balance and the structural balance. The overall fiscal balance drives
public debt dynamics and is therefore the main reference indicator in assessing fiscal sus-
tainability. The structural balance, in turn, relates to another central aspect of assessing
the government’s fiscal policy stance and is a key ingredient of fiscal surveillance because it
separates the effect on the budget of changes in the cyclical position of the economy from
the effect of other factors. However, fundamental data uncertainty, resulting in frequent
output data revisions, may impede budgetary planning and fiscal surveillance. As new
and better information becomes available, GDP figures are revised so that real-time GDP
figures rarely correspond to final GDP figures.
Previous papers have documented revisions of real-time GDP estimates and their im-
plications for output gap estimates; in some cases output data revisions are so large that
governments are unaware whether their country is in a recession or not, or what the sign of
the growth rate is.1 Conceptually, there are several channels through which such revisions
translate into revisions of real-time estimates of the overall and structural balances prior
or even during to the fiscal year. First, changes in output automatically induce changes
in the volume of public spending and revenue. Even if spending and revenue output elas-
ticities are known with complete certainty, inaccurate real-time output growth estimates
therefore mean that it is not possible to correctly estimate fiscal revenue and expenditure
1 See for instance Orphanides and van Norden (2002) using U.S. data, Marcellino and Musso (2011) using
Euro area data, and Ley and Misch (2013) using IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) data covering a
large number of countries.
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streams. Second, fiscal indicators are frequently reported as shares of GDP. As output
data revisions occur, the denominator of these ratios changes as well. Third, decomposing
the overall balance into the cyclical and structural balance requires estimates of the output
gap, and these too are subject to revisions.
Potentially, revisions of output data are therefore a major concern for fiscal policy. Revi-
sions of the overall balance which output data revisions may trigger imply that governments
inevitably miss deficit or surplus targets. In turn, this means that depending on the nature
of output data revisions, fiscal policy is either too tight or results in unplanned debt-to-
GDP accumulation. In addition, fiscal surveillance becomes considerably more difficult and
less reliable, especially when estimates of the structural balance turn out to be inaccurate.
There is rapidly growing literature focusing mostly on developed countries that documents
revisions of fiscal data, i.e., the difference between fiscal projections or forecasts, and
outcomes in terms of actual spending and revenue. Recent evidence suggests that such
revisions may in some cases be sizable; see for instance Beetsma et al. (2012) who report
that on average, the overall budget balance is downward revised by 0.5% of GDP. Hallett
et al. (2011) find that real-time estimates of structural balances that are published by
the OECD for 19 countries are a poor predictor of episodes of significant fiscal loosening.
Much of the earlier literature including for instance Heinemann (2006) that is summarized
in great detail by Leal et al. (2008), discusses the properties of fiscal forecasts and in
particular examines whether there is a systematic bias, whereas the more recent literature
summarized by Cimadomo (2011) also includes an assessment of why such revisions occur.
Obviously, there may be many reasons of why such observed revisions of fiscal data occur.
In this paper, we solely focus on one particular cause, namely output data revisions, which
is the central impediment of the ability of governments to correctly report and project
fiscal indicators in real time. This cause contrasts with other political or institutional
factors for revisions that relate to the willingness of governments, such as strategic and
deliberate misreporting or misprojecting fiscal indicators. Auerbach (1995) distinguishes
three types of factors that result in fiscal data revisions: economic errors which relate to
forecast errors of macroeconomic variables used, policy errors which are mainly of political
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nature, and technical errors which relate to the forecasting model used including its un-
derlying assumptions about behavioral responses. Most existing papers that examine the
determinants of revisions to fiscal data attribute these to the first two factors, namely both
budgetary institutions and other political factors as well as to revisions of GDP growth
projections; see for instance Strauch et al. (2004), Pina and Venes (2011), and de Cas-
tro et al. (2011) for evidence from developed countries and Lledo´ and Poplawski-Ribeiro
(2011) and Frankel (2011) for rare examples that cover both developed and developing
countries. Easterly (2012) suggests that growth slowdowns coupled with overoptimistic
growth projections are key to explain the rapid accumulation of debt in Europe and the
U.S..
Similarly to Kempkes (2012) and Gonza´lez-Mı´nguez et al. (2003), we exclusively use
real-time and final output data as well as the discrepancy between the two to simulate
revisions of the overall balance and the structural balance.2 Using estimates of the bias
of the real-time output gap of the EU-15 countries, Kempkes (2012) roughly estimates
the implications for deficits in a hypothetical scenario in which a fiscal rule prescribes a
deficit target that is inversely related to the output gap (i.e., that allows a higher deficit in
times of recession and vice versa). He multiplies the estimated bias with country-specific
cyclical elasticities of the budget balance and finds that under these assumptions, the deficit
projected using real-time data would on average exceed the deficit under final data by 0.5
to 0.6 percent of potential output in the EU-15 countries. Similarly, Gonza´lez-Mı´nguez et
al. (2003) discuss the effects of revisions to the output gap to revisions of the structural
balance.3
Our approach differs from these papers, and we make two contributions. The first one is
an analytical one: we develop a simple but comprehensive modeling framework to study
2 We express all fiscal indicators including their revisions as a share of GDP. This allows us to ignore the
effects of revisions of other macroeconomic variables, such as inflation, in our analysis.
3 Other papers focus on different aspects that affect output gap estimates and that thereby have impli-
cations for fiscal surveillance. Larch and Langedijk (2007) for instance discuss the implications of using
alternative smoothing parameters for output gap estimates in the context of EU budgetary surveillance.
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the effects of output data revisions on deviations of the overall balance and the structural
balance from original estimates or projections, and on unplanned debt accumulation or
reduction as a result of mistakes in budgetary planning. This framework reflects all three
transmission channels through which output data revisions affect estimates of the overall
and the structural balances prior to the fiscal year, namely (i) revisions in growth which
affect estimates of the magnitude of the cyclical component of revenues and expenditures,
(ii) revisions of the level of GDP as the denominator which affects the shares of fiscal
variables in GDP, and (iii) revisions of the output gap which impact on the decomposition
of the overall balance into the cyclical and structural balances.
An important assumption of the model is that the government anchors its estimate of
a period’s fiscal balance on the previous period’s fiscal balance which limits the effects
of output data revisions and thereby makes our results more credible. We essentially
distinguish two ‘release’ dates of fiscal data which differ with regard to the availability of
final output data. We then compare the concurrent estimates of the overall and structural
balances using output estimates available at the time of budget preparation with the
ones computed when all final release output data are available; in addition, we derive an
expression about how revisions of the overall balance affect public debt over time.
The theoretical framework will set the groundwork for the simulation exercise to quantify
the effects of output data revisions on the overall balance, the structural balance and debt
accumulation using a novel dataset which is our second contribution. Our data come from
the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO), comprising real-time output growth and gap
data for 1990–2007 and final output data from 2012 covering 169 countries.4 These data
allow us to obtain for every country and every year during the 1990–2007 period real-time
and final estimates of output growth and of the output gap, which together with a few as-
sumptions on structural parameters, enables us to compute revisions of fiscal balances and
to simulate debt accumulation. We essentially assume that the government is benevolent
and mechanically uses output data available in real time to make their predictions. We
4 In a companion paper (Ley and Misch, 2013), we present the dataset in detail and include various more
detailed descriptive statistics on output growth and output gap revisions.
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find that while on average revisions of fiscal balances are small, in a relatively high share of
cases, these revisions are nevertheless likely to create significant challenges for budgetary
planning and fiscal surveillance.
The advantage of this type of simulation exercise is that we are able to evaluate the
effects of one particular and potentially important cause of fiscal revisions that determines
government ability and ‘switch off’ all other factors, in particular strategic and political
considerations that may cause governments to deliberately provide wrong estimates of fiscal
indicators. WEO data are probably the best comparable source of real-time data available
for a large number of countries which we discuss more in detail in the next section. The
high quality of WEO data allows us to obtain credible measures of government ability (in
contrast to willingness) to correctly project fiscal balances. Given the large number of
country-year observations, we are able to draw general conclusions for different country
groups. The results have important policy implications. For instance, the results suggest
that countries may deviate from fiscal plans even if governments are benevolent and want
to stick to fiscal targets, which is important in the context of multilateral fiscal surveillance
for instance. In addition, our results provide guidance for fiscal contingency plans in terms
of safety margins.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a description of the data. Section 3
develops the conceptual framework. Section 4 presents the simulation results and Section
5 concludes.
2. A First Look at the Data
As noted, the data come from the IMF World Economic Outlook and consist of output
data from 1966 to 2012 for 169 countries.5 For our purposes, WEO data are particularly
suitable, even though governments of more advanced countries are more likely to use higher
frequency data from national sources for fiscal policy. The WEO predictions are the result
5 We discard 9 countries where output figures appear to systematically not be revised for several years or
where the output series from different vintages do not allow us to compute all variables required for the
simulation in Section 4.
5
of a comprehensive and systematic procedure. The country desks, in consultation with
country governments and other observers, submit their forecasts to the WEO division.
The WEO division makes sure that ‘the pieces fit in’, checking the compatibility of the
forecasts between countries that have significant trade, or share significant trade partners.
Several iterations with individual desks may occur before it is settled on the published
WEO (spring and fall). In addition, compared to government GDP forecasts, WEO data
are likely to be less affected by political interference.6 Together with the fact that release
dates are identical across countries, this implies that WEO data are therefore probably
the best comparable source of real-time data available for a large number of countries.
The dataset contains output figures released in spring and fall from 1990 to 2012—i.e.,
real-time output figures from 24 different vintages where we consider the one from fall 2011
as the one that contains final figures, with some exceptions. We clean the data for outliers
to ensure that our simulation results are not driven by extreme output revisions or output
gaps.7
We use the perspective of the previous-year fall WEO which is the latest data available for
the preparation of the budget (provided that the fiscal and calendar years are congruent)
to appraise the current year’s GDP. Thus, for example, for 1991, we focus on the fall 1990
forecast for 1991 which we shall call concurrent estimate. In a robustness test however,
we use same-year spring estimates which should, in principle, be more accurate. The
justification for using the same-year April WEO vintage would be that if the level of
economic activity could be reliably assessed from this perspective of the first quarter,
6 There are no systematic differences between WEO data and other sources that are deemed reliable;
Timmermann (2007) and Abreu (2012) for instance suggest that the quality of consensus forecasts and
WEO forecasts is similar. Irrespective of the relatively high quality of WEO data, Aldenhoff (2007) and
Dreher et al. (2008) still find evidence of political interference, and recently, Blanchard and Leigh (2013)
show that during the global financial crisis, WEO forecasters underestimated the magnitude of fiscal
multipliers.
7 For instance, due to unusually large shocks such as wars or natural disasters, revisions may be unusually
high. In particular, we discard all observations where the absolute estimated and final output gap is larger
than 25 percent, and where the absolute deviations of the final growth rate and the estimated concurrent
growth rate from the median of the final growth rate are larger than 25 percentage points. In addition,
we discard vintages with fewer than 30 observations which we consider as reasonable to compute trend
output which amounts to less than 0.2% of observations in our dataset.
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then corrective measures could perhaps be implemented to re-direct fiscal policy for the
remaining year. We shall see that is not so. Final estimates are assumed to be available
five years later, so the 1990–2012 data allow us to study the reliability of the 1990–2007
concurrent estimates.
The left panel in Table 1 summarizes descriptive statistics of final growth rates by country
groups. During the period considered, namely from 1991 (first year for which previous year
fall forecasts are available) to 2007 (latest year for which growth figures can be verified),
overall growth averages to an annual four percent, with significant smaller dispersion among
high-income OECD countries, and larger dispersion among low-income countries. The right
panel in Table 1 summarizes the revisions of the growth rate in percentage points which
is the difference between the final figure and concurrent estimates. Given that positive
and negative revisions tend to cancel each other out, the mean is close to zero in most
instances, but in 50% of the cases, that is below the 25th and above the 75th percentiles,
the absolute revision is above 1.75%. The median revision in absolute value is almost
1.82% (not shown here). The standard deviation of the revisions for all country groups is
about the median value of the final growth rates, almost the same order of magnitude as
the standard deviations of the final growth figures, and larger than the standard deviations
of the real-time growth projections.
Table 1. Final growth rates and growth revisions
(169 countries: 1991-2007; N = 2621)
Final growth rates (in %) Revision to growth rates, in perc. points
Quartiles Moments Quartiles Moments
Country Group 25 50 75 Mean StDev 25 50 75 Mean StDev
High income: OECD 1.74 3.11 4.30 3.08 2.48 -0.97 0.10 1.18 0.01 2.18
High income: nonOECD 2.02 4.73 7.28 5.13 5.05 -1.62 0.72 2.70 0.85 4.44
Upper middle income 1.43 4.08 6.40 3.67 4.52 -2.36 0.24 2.49 -0.14 4.37
Lower middle income 2.24 4.41 6.60 4.45 4.52 -1.83 0.06 1.78 -0.04 4.09
Low income 1.67 4.37 6.46 3.77 5.32 -3.04 -0.60 1.25 -1.15 5.19
All countries 1.85 4.00 6.21 3.95 4.50 -1.86 0.05 1.79 -0.19 4.21
Source: WEO data and own compilation
We compute the output gap for each vintage.8 While there are alternative filtering
methods, we use the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter, which is the most common method used,
8 Trend output is estimated here with a Hodrick-Prescott filter and a parameter value of λ = 6.25. The
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to extract the trend from a time series. In addition, we show in Ley and Misch (2013)
that differences across filters tend to be fairly small. The left panel in Table 2 summarizes
descriptive statistics of the final output gaps—i.e., the gaps calculated using data from
the latest vintage. Ignoring the sign, and just looking at their absolute value, the median
values would be about one percentage point of GDP. However, there is some variation from
0.7 percentage points of GDP for high-income OECD countries to 1.3 percentage points
of GDP for upper-middle income countries (not shown here).
Table 2. Final output gaps and output gap revisions
(169 countries: 1991-2007; N = 2621)
Final output gaps (in % of GDP) Revision to output gaps (in % of GDP)
Quartiles Moments Quartiles Moments
Country Group 25 50 75 Mean StDev 25 50 75 Mean StDev
High income: OECD -0.83 -0.12 0.80 -0.03 1.48 -0.50 0.10 0.91 0.21 1.27
High income: nonOECD -1.44 -0.06 1.38 -0.07 2.84 -1.26 0.15 1.18 -0.24 2.86
Upper middle income -1.50 -0.05 1.57 -0.06 2.69 -1.04 0.11 1.51 0.19 2.38
Lower middle income -1.00 -0.05 0.99 -0.04 2.60 -0.78 0.16 1.12 0.13 2.37
Low income -0.95 -0.02 1.16 -0.02 3.01 -0.82 0.18 1.27 0.12 2.94
All countries -1.09 -0.05 1.14 -0.04 2.57 -0.80 0.15 1.17 0.12 2.40
Source: WEO data and own compilation
The right panel in Table 2 represents the summary statistics of the revisions to the output
gap. Most of the statistics are of the same order of magnitude than those in the left panel.
This is a confirmation of the finding, for the U.S., by Orphanides and van Norden (2002),
namely that the uncertainty in the real-time estimates of the output gap is about the
magnitude of the gap itself. In absolute value, roughly for a gap around one percentage
point of GDP, the typical revision will be ±1 percentage points of GDP.
Figure 1 illustrates the uncertainty intrinsic in output-gap estimates. The concurrent
output gaps correspond now to the previous-year’s fall WEO data while ‘final’ output
gaps correspond to the most recent WEO in the sample. The correlation coefficient is a
rather low (0.39). Note that the concurrent estimates are computed with the data that
become available at the end of the first quarter of the same year. In more than one-third
results are similar when other standard univariate filters are used to estimate trend output.
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Fig. 1. Scatter Plot of the Output Gap: Concurrent vs Final (169 countries: 1990-2010)
Predicted Output Gap
⊕ 44% time; of which, the Final Gap is ⊕: 64% cases: 36% cases (changes sign)
 56% time; of which, the Final Gap is ⊕: 39% cases (changes sign): 61% cases
Fig. 2. Effect of GDP Revisions on the Output Gap: Concurrent vs. Final (169 countries 1990-2010)
of the cases, the output gap changes its sign from the concurrent estimate to the final one
(Figure 2).
One important reason behind these revisions in the output-gap estimates is, of course,
that GDP growth projections get substantially revised. This is shown on the right panel of
Table 1, which presents statistics on growth revisions. Apart from the preliminary nature
of output data available in real time which naturally results in output gap revision, output
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gap estimates are also affected by methodological difficulties. Virtually all methods for
estimating trend or potential output at time t require future observations for a number of
periods beyond t (i.e., the methods are based on backward- and forward-looking symmetric
filters). In order to estimate the output gap in real time, the government therefore has to
rely on truncated filters which are suboptimal, and as more observations become available,
the past trend (and gap) gets revised, often substantially. As a result, the government
may even misperceive whether actual output is above or below potential output.
3. Modeling Framework
3.1. Economic Fluctuations and Fiscal Policy
In our model economy, aggregate output, yt, grows over time at rate γt, thus yt = (1 +
γt)yt−1, and is subject to short-run, exogenous shocks so that actual output fluctuates
around potential output represented by its trend, y¯t, giving rise to an output gap, zt:
zt ≡
(
yt − y¯t
y¯t
)
× 100 ≈ [log(yt)− log(y¯t)]× 100 (1)
=
{
> 0 economic activity is over potential
< 0 economic activity is below potential
The output gap, zt, defined in (1), reflects the cyclical position of the economy: when it is
positive then economic activity is above potential, whereas when it is negative then output
is below potential, and there are unemployed resources in the economy.
We assume that the government spends on public services and social transfers and raises
taxes to finance these expenditures. Let e represent government expenditure, and let r
represent its revenue. The resulting budget balance b is simply bt = (rt − et), which can
be negative or positive, depending on whether the government runs a deficit or a surplus.
Parts of expenditure and revenue automatically respond to changes in output: an increase
in economic activity results in higher tax revenue and lower social expenditure, for instance
due to a decrease in unemployment benefits. The elasticity (strictly, buoyancy) of revenue,
ρ, and of expenditure, , can be written as
ρ =
Δr
Δy
÷ r−1
y−1
=
Δr
r−1
× 1
γ
(2)
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 =
Δe
Δy
÷ e−1
y−1
=
Δe
e−1
× 1
γ
(3)
The change of the budget balance as a result of changes in output can be written as
Δb = Δr −Δe = (ρ r−1 −  e−1)γ (4)
3.2. Information Available in Real Time
Key to our modeling framework is the assumption that governments are imperfectly in-
formed about the state of the economy at the time when they need to project future
expenditure and revenue streams. In or shortly prior to period t, available output data
referring to period t is inaccurate, and final figures become only available ex-post, i.e., a
couple of periods after t. As a result, estimates of yt, γt and zt denoted by yˆt, γˆt and zˆt,
respectively, made in real time need to be revised later on as more information becomes
available. We assume that revisions occur at least within four years after period t implying
that the final figures yt, γt and zt are only available in t+5 (i.e., five years in the future).
Obviously, the magnitude of the revisions depends on in which period the output data
were released, i.e., when the estimates of yt, γt and zt were made. For the purpose of
this paper, we focus to what we refer to as concurrent or real-time estimates and assume
that yˆt, γˆt and zˆt are released approximately at the end of the third quarter of period
t− 1 for two reasons, although we slightly relax this assumption as part of the robustness
checks discussed below. On the one hand, supposing that the fiscal year is congruent with
the calendar year, this is most likely to be the newest information that governments may
use to prepare the annual budget. On the other hand, in our data, these dates roughly
correspond to the release dates of the fall estimates of the World Economic Outlook.
Revisions to these estimates are typically non-negligible as for instance Figures 1 and 2
suggest, and result in final figures to differ significantly from concurrent estimates. We
express revisions of concurrent output in relative terms: yˆt gets revised by φt×100 percent
so that yt = yˆt(1 + φ). By contrast, and in line with the literature, we express revisions
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of the growth rate and of the gap in absolute terms, namely as (γt − γˆt) and (zt − zˆt),
respectively.
As a result of preliminary and possibly inaccurate estimates of γt, the government is
unable to correctly project revenue and expenditure for t in real time. In particular, it
estimates revenue, rt(γ), and expenditure, et(γ), using growth estimates, γˆt, as actual
expenditure and revenue flows occurring in t are not yet observed. In order to make
these estimates more reliable, the government uses revenue and expenditure figures from
(t− 1) as an anchor which we assume is observed with reasonable accuracy towards to the
end of this period.9 While this assumptions may seem optimistic as growth in t − 1 and
thereby revenue and expenditure streams are still uncertain, it lowers the effects of output
data revisions implying that our simulation results below are not overly pessimistic. Using
equations (2)–(3), real-time estimates of revenue and expenditure may therefore be written
as
rˆt = rˆt(γˆt) = rt−1 + Δˆr = rt−1 + ρ γˆr−1 (5)
and
eˆt = eˆt(γˆt) = et−1 + Δˆe = et−1 +  γˆe−1 (6)
so that
Δˆb = Δˆrt − Δˆet = (ρrt−1 − et−1)γˆt (7)
By contrast and for simplicity, we assume that there is complete certainty with respect
to the magnitude of the revenue and expenditure elasticities.
3.3. Revisions of the Overall Balance
This sub-section derives the effects of output level and growth revisions on the ability of
the government to correctly project the overall balance which coincides with the ability of
governments to meet a given target for the overall balance. The magnitude of the revision
9 We implicitly assume that the government uses cash accounting. Under accrual accounting, this assump-
tions would not be reasonable.
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of the overall budget balance in terms of GDP is the variable of interest and can be written
as as the difference between the actual balance, (b/y), and the projected / targeted balance,
(bˆ/yˆ), in t: (
bt(γt)
yt
− bˆt(γˆt)
yˆt
)
=
bt(γt)yˆt − bˆt(γˆt)yt
ytyˆt
(8)
Equation (8) shows that we take into account another transmission channel through which
inaccurate concurrent output estimates affect revisions of the budget balance, in contrast
to existing papers. In addition to automatic changes in the budget induced by changes
in output which the government estimates based on preliminary growth figures, we also
consider the effects of revisions to the level of output. The underlying assumption here is
that targets of the overall balance are typically expressed in terms of GDP. There is also
another difference to Kempkes (2012): he assumes that the target of the overall balance
itself is wrongly specified as a result of the forecast bias of output gap estimates, and then
implicitly considers the revisions of the original target. By contrast, we essentially consider
the deviations from a given (and implicitly correctly set target) using differences between
predicted growth rates (and output levels) available at the time of budget preparation and
final figures released ex-post.
Using b = b−1 +Δb and yt = (1 + γt)yt−1, (8) can be re-written as(
bt
yt
− bˆt
yˆt
)
=
(bt−1 +Δbt)yˆt − (bt−1 +Δbˆt)yt
(1 + γt)yt−1yˆt
(9)
=
Δbt − (1 + φt)Δbˆt
(1 + γt)yt−1
− φt
1 + γt
· bt−1
yt−1
(10)
where yt = (1 + φt)yˆt. Substituting for Δb and Δbˆ using (4) and (7) yields(
bt
yt
− bˆt
yˆt
)
=
γt − γˆt − γˆtφt
1 + γt
·
(
ρ
rt−1
yt−1
−  et−1
yt−1
)
− φt
1 + γt
· bt−1
yt−1
(11)
This expression represents the effects of output level and output growth revisions on
revisions of the overall budget balance when expenditure and revenue streams of t− 1 are
certain and those of t are not observed. These revisions may either be positive implying
that the final deficit is smaller than projected, or negative, implying that the final deficit
is larger than projected.
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3.4. Revisions of the Structural Balance
This sub-section derives the effects of output level, growth and gap revisions on the ability
of the government to correctly report the structural balance in real time. We therefore
further split the overall balance into the cyclical balance, bc(z), that depends on the cyclical
position of the economy, and the structural balance, bs, that depends on discretionary fiscal
policy and coincides with the overall balance when z = 0. The structural balance cannot
be observed and therefore must be calculated as a residual:
bst (γt, zt) = bt(γt)− bct(zt) (12)
Note that we assume that structural balance is both driven by output growth which affects
the overall balance and by the output gap which affects the cyclical balance. Using (2)
and (3), the cyclical balance can be expressed as
bct(zt) = zt · [ρ rt(γt)−  et(γt)] (13)
so that the structural balance is a function of γ and z. Changes in the growth rate γ
induce automatic changes to public spending and revenue and thereby the overall balance,
and changes in the gap z affect the cyclical balance.
The difference, as percentage of GDP, between the actual and the estimated structural
balance can be written as(
bst
yt
− bˆ
s
t
yˆt
)
=
(
bt
yt
− bˆt
yˆt
)
−
(
bct
yt
− bˆ
c
t
yˆt
)
(14)
where the first difference on the RHS can be obtained from (11). The second difference on
the RHS may be written as10
(
bct
yt
− bˆ
c
t
yˆt
)
= zt
ρ rt −  et
yt
− zˆt ρ rˆt −  eˆt
yˆt
(15)
10 From (15) to (16), we substitute for r, e, rˆ, and eˆ using (2), (3), (5) and (6). From (16) to (17), we
substitute for y = (1 + γt)yt−1 and yˆ = yt/(1 + φt).
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= zt
ρ rt−1(1 + ρ γ)−  et−1(1 +  γt)
yt
− zˆt ρ rt−1(1 + ρ γˆt)−  et−1(1 +  γˆt)
yˆt
(16)
= zt
ρ rt−1(1 + ρ γt)−  et−1(1 +  γt)
(1 + γt)yt−1
− zˆt ρ rt−1(1 + ρ γˆt)−  et−1(1 +  γˆt)
(1 + γt)yt−1
(1 + φt) (17)
Equation (14), together with (11) and (17), represents the magnitude of the revision of the
structural balance that is required due to output data revisions. Again, these equations
are based on the simplifying assumption that expenditure and revenue flows in t − 1 are
observed towards the end of t−1 when the projections are made. As a consequence towards
the end of period t, bt is known (as expenditure and revenue streams are known) so that
bt = bˆt. This implies that revisions of estimates of b
s
t made towards the end of t are only
driven by revisions of zt and yt. Based on (14) and (15), revisions of estimates of the
structural balance made towards the end of period t can therefore be written as
(
bst
yt
− bˆ
s
t
yˆt
)
= bt
(
1
yt
− 1
yˆt
)
− (ρ rt −  et)
(
zt
yt
− zˆt
yˆt
)
(18)
3.5. Debt Accumulation as a Result of Output Data Revisions
This sub-section examines the implications of output data revisions for debt accumulation
over time. Mistakes in budgetary planning due to output data revisions have consequences
for the level of public debt: unplanned debt accumulation (reduction) occurs if the planned
balance exceeds (is below) the actual balance. In contrast to revisions of the overall balance,
actual debt accumulation is not driven by the unit of measurement, i.e., revisions to the
level of GDP do not matter. By contrast, for the purpose of budgetary planning and fiscal
surveillance, fiscal balances are mostly expressed in terms of GDP.
The change in debt due to output data revisions is simply (bˆt(γˆt)− bt(γt)). If the latter
expression is positive, the stock of debt increases; in the opposite case, the level of debt
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falls. The change in the level of debt resulting from n of these revisions after period t0,
ΔDt0+n, expressed for convenience in terms of final GDP of the nth period, is
ΔDt0+n
yt0+n
=
1
yt0+n
n∑
s=1
(bˆt0+s − bt0+s) (19)
Using (2), (3), (5), (6) to substitute for rt, et, rˆt, and eˆt, respectively, yields
ΔDt0+n
yt0+n
=
1
yt0+n
n∑
s=1
[(ρrt0+s−1 − et0+s−1)(γˆt0+s − γt0+s)] (20)
Using yt0+n = yt0+n−1(1 + γt0+n) to express the latter expression in terms of rt−1/yt−1
and et−1/yt−1 where t = 1 . . . n to facilitate the numerical simulation in the next section
yields
ΔDt0+n
yt0+n
=
n∑
s=1
[(
ρ
rt0+s−1
yt0+s−1
−  et0+s−1
yt0+s−1
)
· γˆt0+s − γt0+s∏n
k=1+s (1 + γt0+k)
]
(21)
Whether over time debt increases or not is an empirical matter and driven by the nature of
output data revisions, in particular the revisions of growth rates, which we turn to below.
4. Simulation
4.1. Parameters
This section assesses numerically the effects of output data revisions on revisions of the
overall balance, revisions of the structural balance based and on unplanned debt accu-
mulation or reduction. From equations (11), (14) and (21), this type of exercise requires
assumptions about a few structural parameters including the magnitude of the overall bal-
ance, cyclical elasticities of revenue and expenditure, and revenue and expenditure shares
in GDP. We obtain country-specific values on output level, output growth and output gap
revisions for which we obtain country-specific values from our dataset (we generate output
level revisions using the data on output growth revisions).
Unfortunately, reliable estimates of revenue and expenditure elasticities are scarce, no-
tably for developing countries. In order to address this problem, we proceed as follows. For
each of the four parameters and for each country group, we set lower and upper bounds.
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We then assume that the parameters are equally distributed within this range (although
later, we relax this assumption and we draw from a triangular distribution as a robustness
check), and then draw values for each parameter and each country group 1,000 times. Note
that for each draw, the resulting parameter values are identical across all countries within
each country group contrary to the information on output data revisions for which we have
annual country-specific observations.
With respect to the elasticities, expenditure elasticities are proportionally related to the
level of income, given that social transfers are low or non-existent in many developing
countries (Berg et al. , 2009). By contrast, the differences in terms of revenue elasticities
between country income groups can be expected to be smaller because direct and indirect
taxes always respond to changes in income, although administrative difficulties to exploit
the full potential tax base in developing countries weaken the link between income and tax
revenue.
There are a few papers available that present estimates. Girourard and Andre´ (2005) is
the standard reference for OECD countries. For revenue elasticities in high-income OECD
countries, their estimates range from 1.10 to 1.42. From this group of countries, we exclude
Slovakia, Czech Republic, and Greece which are now classified as high-income countries
but were likely to share critical features of middle-income economies in past at the time
from which most of the data come that was used to estimate elasticities. In the latter
group of countries, the estimates of Girourard and Andre´ (2005) range from 1.01 to 1.29.
For expenditure elasticities in high-income OECD countries (other OECD countries), their
estimates range from -0.23 to -0.02 (from -0.06 to -0.02). In Bru¨cker (2012) who uses a
novel instrument to estimate revenue elasticities in sub-Saharan countries the range is
from 0.48 to 2.7. Berg et al. (2009) estimate that the elasticity of the overall budget
is 0.2 for sub-Saharan countries. Finally, Martner (2006) estimates revenue elasticities
for a number of Latin American countries which are probably somewhat representative
for middle-income countries. The range is from 0.31 to 1.95. IMF (2009) makes the
assumption that the revenue and expenditure elasticities for middle-income G-20 countries
not covered by Girourard and Andre´ (2005) are one and zero, respectively, which provides
additional guidance for our purposes.
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We use these ranges as guidance for our simulation. However, the evidence base is sketchy,
and the literature does not provide representative estimate ranges for the lower and upper
bounds for each income group. We therefore have to make in part our own assumptions.
We also adjust the ranges in a way that excludes the possibility to draw extreme values
which would potentially inflate the size of fiscal revisions that we obtain. For instance, we
consider the upper estimate by Bru¨cker (2012) as unrealistically high. The ranges that we
employ are summarized in Table 3.
Table 3. Ranges of parameter values for the simulations
r/y b/y ρ ||
Country Group min max min max min max min max
High income: OECD 0.25 0.55 -0.10 0.05 0.90 1.20 0.30 0.02
High income: nonOECD 0.20 0.50 -0.10 0.05 0.80 1.10 0.25 0.01
Upper middle income 0.15 0.40 -0.10 0.05 0.70 1.00 0.10 0.05
Lower middle income 0.10 0.30 -0.10 0.05 0.60 0.90 0.05 0.00
Low income 0.10 0.20 -0.10 0.05 0.60 0.80 0.00 0.00
All countries 0.10 0.55 -0.10 0.05 0.60 1.20 0.00 0.30
Source: based on own assumptions
We apply a similar procedure to obtain revenue and expenditure shares which are likewise
not available for many country-year observations included in our dataset. We therefore as-
sume a lower and upper bound for each country group and assume a uniform distribution.
However, in contrast to elasticities, we do not draw revenue and expenditure shares inde-
pendently which may result in unrealistic budget balances. Rather, we draw the revenue
share and the overall balance and then compute the expenditure share. Table 3 summa-
rizes the assumptions with respect to the range of each parameter and each country group.
As a robustness check, we assume a triangular distribution which puts less weight on the
extreme parameter values.
4.2. Results
What are the implications of inaccurate real-time output data for fiscal policy? Assume
that the government is targeting a specific deficit/surplus, but that the information on the
level of economic activity is uncertain and subject to revisions such as the ones reported in
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Section 2, for each country-year observation in our sample. Assume further a distribution
of the values of the revenue and expenditure elasticities as well as revenue and expenditure
shares as described in the previous subsection. Drawing country group-specific values of
these parameters for each country-year observation 1,000 times (so that values are always
identical per draw within one country group) and calculating the revisions of the overall
balance and the structural balance in each case according to equations (11) and (14) results
in the data underlying Tables 4 and 5.
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics of the revisions of the overall balance. Overall, as
positive and negative revisions tend to cancel each other out, the mean across all country
groups is near zero. By contrast, the distribution of these revisions is widely dispersed: in
20% of the cases, that is below the 10th and above the 90th percentiles, the revision in
absolute terms is at least 1.20% of GDP. The results show that if a government targets
a deficit of 3% of GDP for instance, the chances are 10% that the deficit is indeed above
4.26% and 10% that the deficit is indeed below 1.80%. Both cases are significant deviations
from the original target and are likely to represent significant policy challenges. These
results appear to be consistent with existing evidence: using data from the WEO from
2002 to 2007, Cebotari et al. (2009) report that the 10th percentile of revisions of the
overall balance is 1.7% across all countries. This implies that the simulated revisions of
the overall balance are smaller than observed revisions which makes sense, given that in
practice, other factors contribute to fiscal data revisions as well whereas we only consider
output data revisions.
The revisions of the overall balance are a result of the nature of the output data revisions
and the nature of elasticities where both larger output data revisions and larger elasticities
imply larger revisions of the overall balance. As a result, there is also heterogeneity across
country groups. Revisions of the overall balance are largest in high-income countries which
are not members of the OECD. One underlying reason is that in these countries, revisions
of growth rates are fairly large as a number of countries in this group are major exporters
of oil and other natural resources whose prices are difficult to predict. In addition, given
the stage of development, revenue and expenditure elasticities are likewise relatively large.
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In upper-middle income countries, the dispersion as measured by the 10th and 90th
percentiles is likewise relatively large, which is due to relatively large elasticities and sig-
nificant output data revisions. By contrast, while real-time output data are also inaccurate
in low-income countries, revenue and expenditure elasticities are likewise low implying that
output data revisions do not translate into large revisions of the overall budget.
Table 4. Revisions of the overall balance, % of GDP
(169 countries: 1991-2007; N = 2621000)
Percentiles Moments
Country Group 10 25 50 75 90 Mean StDev
High income: OECD -1.18 -0.48 0.07 0.61 1.18 0.01 1.20
High income: nonOECD -1.84 -0.69 0.21 1.05 2.25 0.16 2.24
Upper middle income -1.57 -0.61 0.05 0.69 1.37 -0.04 1.42
Lower middle income -0.96 -0.36 0.02 0.39 1.03 0.08 1.36
Low income -1.17 -0.48 -0.06 0.26 0.75 -0.16 0.92
All countries -1.26 -0.48 0.02 0.52 1.20 -0.00 1.39
Source: WEO data and own compilation
Table 5 presents descriptive statistics of the revisions of the structural balance by country
group in percent of GDP. Here, the picture is similar compared to Table 4. While revi-
sions of the structural balance are also driven by revisions of the output gap, the mean and
the dispersion of these revisions are not systematically larger than revisions of the overall
balance. Indeed, the dispersion of revisions as measured by the 10th and the 90th per-
centiles of the structural balance across all countries is slightly smaller than the dispersion
of revisions of the overall balance. This suggests that revisions of the output gap and of
output growth may in some cases have different signs so that they cancel each other out,
at least to some extent, and that growth revisions appear to be relatively more important
for fiscal projections. There is a similar pattern of heterogeneity across country groups
with high-income countries that are not members of the OECD and upper-middle incomes
showing the largest dispersion of revisions of the structural balance, whereas low-income
and lower-middle income countries showing the smallest dispersion.
As a final step, Table 6 translates the revisions of the overall balance into debt accumula-
tion over a 10-year period. We proceed as follows: based on the dataset with 1,000 country
group-specific parameter draws for each country-year observation, we draw all parameters
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Table 5. Revisions of the structural balance, % of GDP
(169 countries: 1991-2007; N = 2621000)
Percentiles Moments
Country Group 10 25 50 75 90 Mean StDev
High income: OECD -1.22 -0.58 -0.04 0.49 1.04 -0.07 1.02
High income: nonOECD -1.53 -0.63 0.21 1.08 2.28 0.30 2.06
Upper middle income -1.47 -0.65 -0.02 0.59 1.27 -0.07 1.25
Lower middle income -0.89 -0.38 -0.03 0.37 1.00 0.06 1.33
Low income -1.10 -0.51 -0.09 0.22 0.70 -0.18 0.86
All countries -1.20 -0.52 -0.03 0.46 1.14 -0.02 1.28
Source: WEO data and own compilation
and output data revisions 10 times for each country group to calculate debt accumulation
over a 10-year period using equation (21). We repeat this procedure 1,000 times.
Table 6 presents the change of government debt in percent of GDP. Compared to Table 4,
the dispersion and the mean across all countries is significantly larger (note that whereas
in Table 4, a positive sign denotes a surplus, in Table 6, a positive sign refers to increases in
the stock of public debt). In 10% of the cases (i.e., above the 90th percentile), the increase
of the stock of debt is at least 3.17% of GDP, whereas in 10% of the case (i.e., below the
10th percentile), the decrease of the stock of debt is at least 4.26% of GDP. While these
changes of debt may appear to be small, they are nevertheless significant given that they
are solely due to missing deficit or surplus targets as a result of inaccurate real-time output
growth figures.
There is again heterogeneity across country groups. This time, the 90th percentile in high-
income countries and upper-middle income countries is largest across all country groups
suggesting that here, the risk of unwanted debt accumulation is largest. By contrast,
relatively large surprise debt reductions may also occur: in high-income countries that are
not members of the OECD, in 10% of the cases, a surprise debt reduction is at least 8.52%
of GDP. The possibility of a surprise debt reduction tends to be lowest in low-income
countries where in only 10% of the cases, such a debt reduction is above 0.94% of GDP.
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Table 6. Debt accumulation over 10 years, in % of the 10th period’s GDP
(169 countries: 1991-2007; N = 50000)
Percentiles Moments
Country Group 10 25 50 75 90 Mean StDev
High income: OECD -3.96 -2.18 -0.26 1.63 3.78 -0.13 3.17
High income: nonOECD -8.52 -5.27 -2.49 0.44 2.90 -2.66 4.60
Upper middle income -3.88 -1.97 -0.06 2.03 4.42 0.16 3.26
Lower middle income -1.98 -0.93 0.18 1.21 2.23 0.13 1.73
Low income -0.94 -0.07 0.88 1.90 2.98 0.97 1.57
All countries -4.26 -1.88 -0.01 1.54 3.17 -0.31 3.31
Source: WEO data and own compilation
4.3. Robustness Checks
We perform three robustness checks to test how vulnerable the magnitude and the disper-
sion of the revisions of the overall and structural balances are to our assumptions. First,
in Tables 7 and 8, instead of using previous-year fall output data, we use same-year spring
estimates to compute the revisions of the overall budget and the structural balance. This
allows us to also include 1990 for which only same-year estimates are available. Here, the
rationale for the virtual experiment is that the government could make use of more re-
cent and hence more up-to-date output information released relatively early in the current
fiscal year when corrective actions to the budget may still be feasible. For simplicity, we
still maintain the assumptions that revenue and expenditure streams of t− 1 are observed
whereas those of t are not observed. However, our results suggest that even with same-year
spring-WEO output data, the dispersion of the revisions of the overall budget balance and
the structural balance remain large: in particular, in 20% of the cases, the revisions are
above 1% of GDP in both cases. The dispersion slightly decreases.
Second, and similarly, we use same-year fall-WEO output data available for 1990 to 2007
to compute revisions of the structural balance according to (18) in Table 9. According to
our (simplifying) assumptions, towards the end of any period t, expenditure and revenue
streams of that period are known so that at this point in time, bˆt = bt. Revisions of the
structural balance fall, but they still remain large. In more than 20% of the cases, revisions
exceed 0.74% of GDP.
As a third robustness check, we test whether our results are driven by extreme values of
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Table 7. Revisions of the overall balance, in % of GDP, same-year spring output data
(169 countries: 1990-2007; N = 2791000)
Percentiles Moments
Country Group 10 25 50 75 90 Mean StDev
High income: OECD -0.77 -0.31 0.19 0.65 1.14 0.15 1.01
High income: nonOECD -1.65 -0.54 0.25 1.07 2.14 0.21 2.27
Upper middle income -1.32 -0.50 0.09 0.65 1.38 0.05 1.29
Lower middle income -0.87 -0.31 0.03 0.39 1.00 0.10 1.26
Low income -1.01 -0.40 -0.04 0.26 0.73 -0.11 0.89
All countries -1.06 -0.38 0.05 0.53 1.19 0.06 1.31
Source: WEO data and own compilation
Table 8. Revisions of the structural balance, in % of GDP, same-year spring output data
(169 countries: 1990-2007; N = 2791000)
Percentiles Moments
Country Group 10 25 50 75 90 Mean StDev
High income: OECD -1.07 -0.48 0.06 0.56 1.09 0.00 1.03
High income: nonOECD -1.50 -0.61 0.24 1.08 2.22 0.30 2.07
Upper middle income -1.36 -0.58 0.00 0.59 1.28 -0.04 1.23
Lower middle income -0.88 -0.34 -0.02 0.36 0.95 0.06 1.24
Low income -1.00 -0.46 -0.09 0.21 0.67 -0.16 0.85
All countries -1.12 -0.46 -0.01 0.47 1.13 0.01 1.25
Source: WEO data and own compilation
Table 9. Revisions of the structural balance, in % of GDP, same-year fall output data
(169 countries: 1990-2007; N = 2639000)
Percentiles Moments
Country Group 10 25 50 75 90 Mean StDev
High income: OECD -0.85 -0.44 -0.06 0.28 0.63 -0.08 0.70
High income: nonOECD -1.23 -0.56 -0.05 0.46 1.12 -0.07 1.48
Upper middle income -0.97 -0.45 -0.03 0.34 0.84 -0.04 0.88
Lower middle income -0.64 -0.25 -0.02 0.24 0.69 0.05 1.19
Low income -0.73 -0.33 -0.04 0.21 0.61 -0.07 0.66
All countries -0.85 -0.37 -0.03 0.28 0.74 -0.03 0.99
Source: WEO data and own compilation
the revenue and expenditure elasticities and shares in GDP. Instead of assuming a uniform
parameter distribution, we assume a triangular distribution function which places less
emphasis on the extreme parameter values, i.e., the lower and upper bounds. Compared
to Tables 4 and 5, the results of Tables 10 and 11 hardly change suggesting that our main
results are not driven by extreme draws from the tails.
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Table 10. Revisions of the overall balance, in % of GDP, triangular distribution
(169 countries: 1991-2007; N = 2634000)
Percentiles Moments
Country Group 10 25 50 75 90 Mean StDev
High income: OECD -1.15 -0.48 0.08 0.62 1.14 0.01 1.17
High income: nonOECD -1.93 -0.71 0.23 1.07 2.17 0.14 2.22
Upper middle income -1.57 -0.64 0.07 0.72 1.38 -0.04 1.40
Lower middle income -0.98 -0.38 0.03 0.42 1.02 0.06 1.21
Low income -1.21 -0.49 -0.07 0.25 0.69 -0.19 0.89
All countries -1.27 -0.50 0.03 0.54 1.18 -0.01 1.33
Source: WEO data and own compilation
Table 11. Revisions of the structural balance, in % of GDP, triangular distribution
(169 countries: 1991-2007; N = 2634000)
Percentiles Moments
Country Group 10 25 50 75 90 Mean StDev
High income: OECD -1.22 -0.60 -0.04 0.48 0.99 -0.08 1.00
High income: nonOECD -1.58 -0.66 0.23 1.10 2.23 0.30 2.00
Upper middle income -1.47 -0.67 -0.01 0.62 1.27 -0.08 1.23
Lower middle income -0.90 -0.41 -0.03 0.39 0.98 0.04 1.17
Low income -1.11 -0.52 -0.10 0.19 0.63 -0.20 0.82
All countries -1.20 -0.54 -0.04 0.46 1.11 -0.03 1.21
Source: WEO data and own compilation
As a final exercise, we empirically analyze more in depth the drivers of our results, i.e.,
the role that different factors play for the magnitude and nature of the overall balance and
structural balance revisions, using basic OLS regressions. To this end, we standardize the
absolute value of the revisions of the overall and the structural balance and the variables
and parameters that affect them, including the output growth, gap and level revisions,
(γ− γˆ), φ, and (z− zˆ), respectively, and of revenue and expenditure elasticities and shares
in GDP, as a means, although an imperfect one, to linearize equations (11) and (14).
Table 12 presents the results. It shows that revisions of output growth, the level of
output have a relatively large effect on the overall balance. With respect to the structural
balance, these revisions together with revisions of the output gap are important relative
to the remaining coefficients. The results further suggest that the expenditure elasticity,
the revenue elasticity, and the share of expenditure in GDP hardly play any role for our
results. The share of revenue in GDP lies somewhere in between these extremes, but the
revenue elasticity appears to be also less important.
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Table 12. Determinants of the revisions of the overall and the structural balances
log of standardized absolute value of:
[b/y − bˆ/yˆ] [bs/y − bˆs/yˆ]
Constant 0 0
(0) (0)
γ − γˆ .499*** .354*
(0) (0)
φ .487*** .518*
(0) (0)
 .035*** .019*
(.001) (.001)
ρ .054*** .046*
(.001) (.001)
r
y .182*** .172*
(.001) (.001)
e
y .03*** .03*
(.001) (.001)
z − zˆ .028*
(0)
Standard errors in parentheses.
*p < 0.01
Standardized absolute value of all variables have been used
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5. Conclusions
The difference between real-time GDP projections and the final figures released a few years
later impairs the ability of policy makers to correctly project fiscal revenues and expen-
ditures in real time, which, in turn, results in revisions of the overall and the structural
fiscal balances. We develop a comprehensive theoretical framework that considers three
transmission channels through which output data revisions matter for fiscal policy in prac-
tice, namely through (i) revisions to estimates of GDP growth which matter given that tax
revenue and public spending automatically respond to changes in economic activity, (ii)
revisions to the level of GDP which matter given that fiscal balances are typically reported
as shares of GDP, and (iii) revisions to output gaps which matter for decompositions of
overall balances into the cyclical and structural balances.
Our simulation results with respect to the magnitude of the revisions of the overall balance
and the structural balance may be regarded as a lower bound because we eliminated outliers
from the WEO data, and we excluded the recent period of global economic turmoil where
output data revisions may have been particularly large. We also took care not to consider
extreme values of revenue and expenditure elasticities, and we assumed that previous-
year expenditure and revenue are observable at the time when the budget is prepared, or
when the structural balance is estimated. Nevertheless, even under these assumptions, our
simulation results suggest that revisions of the overall and the structural balance may be
substantial and above 1 percent of GDP in absolute terms in more than one-fifth of the
cases. These results are fairly robust to various changes in the underlying assumptions.
Chances are similar that as a result of these revisions of the overall balance, unplanned
debt accumulation or a surprise debt reduction over a period of 10 years of above 3.17
percent of GDP occurs. We have also explored differences between country income groups
and found that they are significant. Our results with respect to the simulated overall
balance appear to be consistent with evidence on actual revisions of the overall balance
provided by Cebotari et al. (2009).
Future research could address various immediate extension of this paper: on the one
hand, our model predictions with respect to the revisions of the overall balance as a func-
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tion of output data revisions could be compared with actual revisions of fiscal indicators.
Alternatively, our modeling framework could be extended to consider uncertainty about
the exact magnitude of revenue and expenditure elasticities. For instance, when predicting
the budget balance, governments could wrongly estimating these elasticities in addition to
relying on potentially inaccurate output data. These model extensions would be likely
to inflate simulated values of balance revisions, but at the same time, it would make our
model more realistic.
The results presented here have important policy implications. On the one hand, they
caution about taking real-time estimates about the structural balance for the purpose
of fiscal surveillance at face value and suggest that they may be wrong by significant
margins. On the other, the results suggest that in the context of budgetary planning,
governments should take into account that they may miss fiscal targets due to output data
revisions. This in turn implies that governments may set targets in a way that encompasses
safety margins to reflect for instance the possibility that growth estimates are significantly
revised. The results of this paper provide guidance about how to set such safety margins
based on past experience. The bottom line of the paper is that, in real time, the overall and
structural balances should be better considered as known unknowns instead of wishfully
being treated as known knowns fiscal indicators.11 What you do not know that you do not
know may be sometimes more important that what you certainly know.
11 U.S. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, insightfully remarked: “There are known knowns: there
are things we know that we know. There are known unknowns: that is to say there are things that, we
now know we don’t know. But there are also unknown unknowns: there are things we do not know we do
not’t know.”
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